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On the absence of a measurement problem
in quantum computer science
N. David Mermin
Laboratory of Atomic and Solid State Physics
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-2501
I comment on GianCarlo Ghirardi’s criticism of my claim that quantum
computation has no measurement problem.
In view of GianCarlo Ghirardi’s remarks (arXiv:0806.0647) about my In Praise of
Measurement (arXiv:quant-ph/0612216), I should clarify what I meant to say in that paper
and in the conference lecture on which it was based. I wanted to make two points about
measurement in quantum computer science. The first was that the simple and crucial role
of measurement gates deserved greater emphasis:
(a) The only measurement gates ever needed are multiple copies of a single one,
that acts on a single Qbit. All other processes called “measurement” can be
built out of 1-Qbit measurement gates and unitary gates. The question of what
qualifies as a measurement has a precise answer.
(b) Applying and reading measurement gates is an indispensable part of any
computation. If gates were restricted to unitary gates, then quantum computation
would be useless, since no user could acquire any numerical information.
(c) In addition to creating the output of the computation, measurement gates are
the most conceptually straightforward and pedagogically economical way to get
the computation underway, by, for example, enabling the user to assign to each
Qbit the initial state |0〉.
My second point was that if quantum mechanics were only a branch of computer
science that applied only to the operation of quantum computers, then there would be
no measurement problem. This conclusion grew out of my experience teaching quantum
mechanics to computer scientists for 6 years, during which no “measurement problem” ever
arose in the course of innumerable discussions with students trying to learn the subject
without any prior knowledge of quantum mechanics, and during which I, as teacher, never
felt dissatisfied with what I was able to tell the students, as I do at various points when
teaching a physics course in conventional quantum physics. For more on this see Part 3 of
Copenhagen Computation: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bohr (arXiv:quant-
ph/0305088).
Ghirardi objects to my second point, making me realize that I should have been more
emphatic that the claim in my article that there is no measurement problem is limited to
quantum computer science. My abstract says “I argue that within the field of quantum
computer science the concept of measurement is . . . unproblematic . . . .” And in the paper
1
I say my subject is “the role of measurement in quantum computation.” And toward the
end I say that measurement “is [not] problematic in quantum computer science.” Only
in the last five paragraphs do I raise the question of whether “this generalizes beyond
quantum computation” and make some tentative suggestions about how it might.
I should, however, have stated explicitly that I was not claiming that quantum compu-
tation provided a solution to the broader measurement problem, but only that it described
a conceptual microcosm within which there was nothing problematic about measurement.
I did not intend to imply that this “weakened or even cancelled” John Bell’s criticisms of
quantum mechanics as a satisfactory picture of the entire physical world. On the contrary,
at the beginning I say “I’m not sure Bell would have found any of the remarks that follow
compelling, or even suggestive.” To underline my reservations about how Bell might have
reacted I voice the hope that Anton Zeilinger (the honoree at the conference) might “take
a more sympathetic view of it than Bell might have done.” After that, aside from asserting
that Bell would have enjoyed the quantum information revolution, I don’t speculate on how
he might have responded, mentioning him only when I note how some of his complaints
about quantum foundations look in the restricted setting of quantum computer science. I
brought Bell into the story because the talk was at a conference of people, most of whom
were more involved in aspects of quantum information, than they were in quantum foun-
dations. I could not assume that all (or even most) of them had heard of a “measurement
problem”, and could imagine no more effective way of introducing them to the issues than
to refer them to and quote from Bell’s brilliant and delightful essay, Against Measurement.
On the matter of Bell’s use of “exact”, I was indeed thinking only of his definition of
“exact” in Against Measurement : “fully formulated in mathematical terms, with nothing
left to the discretion of the theoretical physicist.” I didn’t know (or had forgotten) that,
as Ghirardi points out, elsewhere Bell uses the term to mean a theory that “neither needs
nor is embarrassed by an observer.” But had I known this, I would have added a remark to
the effect that the “user”, though not always explicit in computer science, can hardly be
viewed as an embarrassment to the field. (I know an information scientist at Cornell whose
specialty is “The Computer-Human Interface”. As far as I know, this does not embarrass
her or her colleagues.) I do talk about the “user”, particularly in joking about God and
Einstein’s mouse, but without realizing that I was touching on another aspect of Bell’s
notion of “exactness”.
Having said this, I must acknowledge that Ghirardi correctly infers that there are
matters on which we disagree. My own current view is along the lines of the Bohr quotation
I give at the beginning of In Praise of Measurement: “In our description of nature the
purpose is not to disclose the real essence of the phenomena but only to track down, so
far as it is possible, relations between the manifold aspects of our experience.” I take
this to mean that quantum states are not entities with an objective existence, or inherent
properties of the systems with which they are associated, but mathematical constructs
that enable us to relate some of our experiences (e.g. what we read on the display of the
2
measurement gates that prepare the initial state) to others (e.g. what we read when we
look at the display of the final measurement gates). When we have new experiences we
update our state assignments accordingly, and this is indeed a nonlinear alteration. But
what is altered is an abstraction that provides a remarkably effective starting point for
subsequent calculation; it is not a real essence of the phenomena.
Admittedly, for this to be a coherent position, one must take some of the manifold as-
pects of our experience to lie beyond the domain that physics describes. The concepts that
physics has developed are incapable of capturing the taste — the indescribable flavor — of
individual conscious experience. Physics has the goal of accounting for correlations among
different aspects of that (irreducible) experience (which is all we could possibly need from
it). Quantum computer science illustrates this strikingly and unproblematically through
a user, whose personal experience makes possible the initial input and acknowledges the
final output.
If there is a tricky conceptual issue within quantum computer science it is not a mea-
surement problem, but a unitary-evolution problem. Measurements are a conceptually
straightforward part of how you initiate and conclude the computation. But the state
that evolves unitarily after the initial and before the final measurements is more subtle.
Students (and many contemporary physicists, including, I believe, Ghirardi) want to re-
gard the state as a real essence of the phenomena — an objective property of the Qbits
(as we are used to regarding the state of classical Cbits) — even though there is no way
to determine what the state is, given only the Qbits, and even though that view leads
unambiguously to unmediated (spooky) action at a distance. In teaching quantum com-
putation to computer science students (and in my book Quantum Computer Science: An
Introduction) I stress that the state and the unitary transformations it is subject to are
mathematical abstractions that enable one to compute from a knowledge of the readings
of the initial measurement gates and the components of the circuit that follows, the prob-
abilities of the readings of the final measurement gates. Mathematical abstractions do not
require stochastic “hits” originating in unknown physical processes (or interactions with
gravitons) to be reset; they are reset by us, when we acquire more information and want
to calculate what we can expect to experience next.
So I do maintain that there is no measurement problem within quantum computer
science. And I very much wish that John Bell were still among us to object.
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